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- 120 THE RIGHT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
F. Parkinson
The historical context in which the problem of the 'right' to
economic development has become acute was the mass influx of newly
independent developing countries into international society and into the
United Nations in the early 1960's. Before that the task of fostering
the economic development of underdeveloped areas of the third world had
been the responsibility of colonial governments almost everywhere, except
in Latin America which had enjoyed political, though not always economic
independence, since the early nineteenth century.
In the 1960's the problem of international economic equality became
the responsibility of international society as a whole, and its
international economic institutions in particular, against the background
of a growing chorus of dissatisfaction on the part of the developing
countries now commanding an impressive numerical preponderance in the
General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Genesis of a Right
A right in any system of law has to be both felt and articulated
before it can be expressed in the form of legal claims, and the system of
international law is no exception. When we think of a 'right', moreover,
we tend to associate it with the two notions of justice and equity.
While justice is a general notion, equity has acquired a well established
technical meaning in the English, as in other legal systems, in which it
may be regarded as a legal device for redressing injustices arising from
the rigidities of applied law.
However, though not a downright stranger, the notion of equity is a
relative newcomer in international law, for it is only in recent years
that it has acquired some significance in international economic
relations. An early, timid attempt at defining the concept of equity was
made by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of the Norwenian
Shipowners Claims in 1922, in which equity was described in a somewhat
evasive fashion as a "general principle of justice...distinguished from
any particular system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any
State."1 Fifteen yeeis later, by way of stark contrast, Judge Hudson
of the same Court attempted a rather bold and controversial definiticn
when he stated, somewhat magisterially, in the case of the Diversion of
the Waters of the River euse in 1937 that "equity (was) part of the law
and as such had meant 'equality'. 2
It was only from 1969 onwards that judicial reluctance to accept the
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case of the North Sea Continental Shelf saw in it a convenient instrument
for apportioning the space of that continental shelf among a number of
claimants.3 It has since become increasingly plain that the principle
of equity may be usefully applied on the highest level of international
law, whenever and wherever economic resources have to be shared
internationally.
These judicial pronouncements may suggest that there are certain
affinities in present day international law between the concept of
international equity on the one hand, and that of international economic
equality on the other hand. Not surprisingly, the developing countries
have tended to stress the latter aspect, whereas the developed ones have
preferred to interpret equity in the manner in which it has been
traditionally employed in their own systems of municipal law.

The Right to Economic Development on the Level of International Practice
So far we have dealt with the right to economic development only as
reflected in the sphere of jurisprudence. One might conceivably obtain a
clearer idea of its implications by asking whether the existence of such
a right can be deduced from international legal practice within the
United Nations. In particular one would want to know whether a right of
this sort is still in the process of evolution.

The three Development Decades of the United Nations, as formulated in
Resolutions of the General Assembly, even though they carry moral, rather
than fully binding weight, may give us some clues, as each of those
Decades has taken the process of conceptual clarification a step further.

(i)

The First U.N. Development Decade (1961-1971)

During that Decade heavy emphasis was placed on the need for economic
growth. Three assumptions, largely drawn from Walt Rostow's theory of
The Stages of Economic Growth,4 underlay the conception of that
Development Decade. In the first place, it was assumed that if only
determined measures were taken to stimulate economic orowth all round,
this would trigger off the so-called 'trickle-down' effect whereby, even
though considerable international economic inequalities would remain, the
poor countries would benefit eventually. In the second place, the
'trickle-down' process would culminate in a so-called ' take-off' into
self-sustaining economic growth. To help the process along, a target of
5 percent growth was posited for the Decade, but no legal obligations
were attached to the attainment of that target.. Finally, Walt Rostow's
theory assumed that the benefits from economic growth all round would
spread across existing international political frontiers on a universal
canvas.
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The Second Development Decade (1971-1981)

By and large, those assumptions turned out to be fallacious, as it
was being realised that benefits were failing to trickle down to the
lowest layers of the international economic scale, and that, moreover,
rates of economic growth were lowest in the poorest countries. The
question therefore arose what measures should be taken during the Second
Development Decade to remedy those deficiencies.
However, equal opportunities would not arrive unaided, and the key
question had therefore to be asked whether the better off States should
have to assume a positive duty to implement economic development not only
within their own political frontiers, but also on an international
scale. It was in this way that the debate on the right to economic
development was extended from the municipal into the international sphere
where it produced important legal consequences by enabling the developing
countries to make claims which were measurable by strict international
legal, instead of just general technical standards.
Thus, beyond raising the target of economic growth for the impending
Decade from 5 to 6 percent, therGeneral Assembly for the first time
decided in 1971 to set a definite target of international aid to the
developing countries at the rate of 0.7 per cent of the Gross INational
Product of developed countries. An attempt by the developing countries
to make the fulfilment of that target legally binding, however, failed.
Nonetheless, a new trend was initiated which, taken to its logical
conclusion, would ultimately amount to no less than the imposition of an
international transfer tax.
Since most of the sanguine expectations of the First Development
Decade had been disappointed, and since a percentage point had been set
for international aid, the United Nations had to provide clear
quantitative indicators of what represented a developing country, and put
into legal terms that meant identifying the bearers of rights and duties
with some precision in that context.
To draw a line between developed and developing countries proved
impossible, and the only thing on which all States could agrea was now to
define the category of "least developed countries", and by doing so,
establish an international 'poverty line'. Three criteria were to
obtain: to qualify for the status of a "least developed country" it had
to be shown that (i) the National Income of the country concerned was
less than $100 per head per year; (ii) its manufacturing sector took up
10 per cent or less of its total industrial sector; and (ii)
its degree
of literacy was 20 per cent or below of its population.
This quantification proved useful in the subsequent evolut*ion of the
right to economic development, as it enabled the United Nations to
elaborate the Concept of 'oasic neer's' - which was to domlnate United
Nations action in this sph.ere throughout the 1970's - in quantitative
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terms. The concept obtained some intellectual nourishment from the North
American author John Rawls, whose book, A Theory of Justice, published in
1971, created a considerable general impact. In.this work, Rawls
attempted to link the idea of justice to the concept of economic equality
on the basis of a novel scheme of priorities. Rawls proposed that where
economic and social inequalities could not be avoided, they were to be
arranged in such a manner as to be of the greatest benefit to the least
advantaged, in order to safeguard their interests as recipients of income
and wealth.
The implications of Rawls' thesis began to be felt amost immediately
on the international plane, as the standard of formal legal equality
between States - hitherto unquestioned - was gradually being displaced in

United Nations practice by the new standard of positive discrimination in
favour of the most needy States. This represented one more step in a
series of steps already taken to give the concept of equity a handsome
twist in the direction of international economic equality. If that
conception were to be expressed in a formula, one could say that
international material equality equalled formal international equality
plus international equity.
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that in 1974 the General
Assembly should have passed three important Resolutions calling for the
creation of a New International Economic Order in which the notion of
equity, in the present sense, was made robustly explicit, rather than
discreetly hinted at, as had been the case previously. Claims for
redistributive justice were to pervade the entire text of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States - at once the most important of
those three Resolutions and its climax. Stripped of technicalities and
reduced to its simplest terms, the central message of that Charter
appeared to be: special treatment on the basis of special needs. The
point was pressed home in a General Assembly Resolution passed in 1975
which - to give further emphasis of the concept of 'basic needs' -

created two new categories of States; namely i)the "least developed,
landlocked and island countries", and (ii)"those most seriously affected
by economic crises and natural disasters."5
Nor was this trend confined to the theoretical plane of Resolutions
of the General Assembly since, under the new management of Mr. Robert
McNamara, the World Bank, the chief lending agency of the United Nations,
was to undergo a major strategic reorientation which came to be known,
with some exaggeration, as the 'McNamara Revolution'. The swiftness and
energy with which McNamara acted was impressive, and it was not his fault
that he did not always obtain the necessary funds to carry out the new
strategy to maximum effect.
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(iii)

The Third Development Decade (1981-1991)

If the strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade may
be considered as positive where the elaboration of the concept of the
right to economic development on the international plane was concerned,
the proposals for the Third Development Decade were undistinguished,
owing largely to the deterioration of the international economic
climate. Thus, the target for economic growth was raised from 6 to 7 per
cent, while the target for international aid of 0.7 per cent was
retained, but, wherever possible, was to be reached at the halfway stage
of the Decade, before 1985, or as soon as possible after that.
Similarly, aid to the by now well established category of "least
developed countries" was to be doubled, wherever possible. None of these
provisions was novel in itself, representing merely an accentuation and
amplification of principles inserted into the previous Development
Decade. However, two innovations call for comment. In the first place,
a specific target increase of 9 percent per annum was set for the rate of
industrialisation of developing countries with the object of increasing
their industrial output to 25 per cent of world industrial production by
the year 2000. In the second place, the new principle of self-help was
introduced, which, taken to its logical conclusions, could produce major
repercussions in the outlook of developing countries in the near future.
It is perhaps not altogether a coincidence that Raul Prebisch should have
chosen this moment to give his vigorous endorsement to the principle of
self-help. This is all the more remarkable since during the two previous
Development Decades he had, if anything, put his faith in the developing
countries' ability and willingness to do all in their power to integrate

and assimilate the developing countries within the world liberal economic
system by the pursuit of enlightened policies of financial aid and
preferential commercial treatment. In 1981, by way of contrast, he was
urging the developing countries to take their fate into their own hands
by elaborating autoncmous co-operative techniques of economic
development, while leaving the developed countries to their own
devices.6

A Critical Assessment
The developing countries' ceaseless agitation for the promotion of
the right to economic development in international law has yielded some
small but concrete legal gains. The most important, because the most
lasting of these is the recognition in international law of developing
countries as a separate juridical category, even though, by its very
nature, it was bound to be transient, since countries are expected to
move out of, and some very few back into the state of uncerdevelcpment.
On the whole, however, the evolution of the right to economic development
in international law has not passed the point where its legitimacy can be
accepted without a shadow of a doubt. There is'still a long haul from
legitimacy to legality. Legitimacy rests on consensus and its effect is

- 125 -

moral, not legal. International legality must at all times rest -on
consent granted by States on the basis of treaties and custom, the two
principal law-creating agencies of international law.
It has been said by some most distinguished international lawyers
that a quasi-parliamentary custom is growing up in the sphere of
international law-creation whereby consensus on a basis of numerical
majorities may suffice to create binding rules, and Resolutions and
Declarations of the General Assembly of the United Nations have been
expressly mentioned in this connection. 7 Reasoning along those lines
is holding a considerable appeal to spokesmen of underdeveloped countries.
However, it may also be argued a contrario that the instruments of
consensus and consent ought not to be confused, and that principles of
natural law ought to be kept severely separate from those of positive
law. Moreover, most Resolutions of the General Assembly in this area
have tended to be the outcome of uneasy compromise between the developing
and developed countries wherever cardinal issues were at stake, that have
solved nothing. The point is that an approach of this kind, though
carrying considerable moral weight, lacks effectiveness. As Jeremy
Bentham once remarked "individual natural rights have force only if
recognized in conventional law; otherwise they remain merely
rhetorical". It would, therefore, seem essential to the further
promotion of a right to economic development in international law that
the developing countries emerge as soon as possible from the murky
grey-zone of consensus into the broad daylight of positive international
legality by taking the final step from the abstract right to the concrete
law of economic development. The multilateral convention, resorted to
with ever greater frequency in the second half of the present century,
suggests itself as the proper vehicle for effecting that transition in
specific sectors, such as trade in commodities; regulation of liner
conferences; the transfer of technology; the control of the activities of
transnational corporations and others. Already the developing countries
have acquired in the 'Group of 77', and its sub-group, the 'Group of
Non-Aligned Countries', especially in the latter's Economic Committee,
means of articulation and agitation by which their demands can be fed
into the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
where they can receive further airing and debate.

The Unacceptable Face of Positivism
The chief virtue of positivism lies in its ability to ensure
certainty of the law and prevent confusion between lex ferenda and lex
lata. However, there is also an unacceptable face to positivism, -i-ch
shows itself whenever it is used as a means for preservin an outworn
status quo in the face of widespread clamour for change. Wherever that
can be shown to be the case in the sphere of economic development, the
developing countries could do worse than heed the words of the nineteenth
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century German jurist Rudolf von Jhering, who, in true Hegelian style,
regarded legal rights in the positivist sense as the by-product of
historical struggles. To overcome unreasonable resistance to change, the
developing countries would be well advised to club together in order to
challenge an international political order which is underpinning an
obsolescent international economic order, and in that fashion to do away

with positivist obstruction.

An essential prerequisite for the success of such a strategy is
diplomatic unity, and that may not be always easy to achieve where there
are significantly diverging interests, and when there is a worldwide
economic recession. iHowever, the record on that score is not too
discouraging, considering that firm diplomatic unity was maintained
during the successful negotiations that have resulted in the conclusion
of the two Lomb conventions - albeit at the expense of some Asian and
Latin American countries; and that a fairly firm front has been
maintained during the nine years of protracted negotiations that
culminated in the signing of the Convention on the Law of the Sea at
Montego Bay in 1982.
The chances of success for the developing countries are perhaps best
where they can command substantial bargaining power. Present trends
towards the formation of international producer and exporter associations
of widely traded commodities are a case in point. 8 Their right to do
so has so far gone unchallenged. Here is a fascinating analogy with the
evolution of labcur law in nineteenth century England, where trade unions
had to break the law of sedition in order to secure the right of
association. Two approaches have been used to achieve this end. On the
continent, the unions have fought for the enactment of bills of labour
rights, whilst in England they were able to extract immunities from the
full rigour of availanle executive sanctions. The Charter of Economic
Rights and Outies of States, passed in the form of a Resolution of the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, makes express mention of
the right of developing countries to organise international associations
of producers and exporters of commodities, and the phrasing used would
suggest that the English, rather than the continental approach will be
adopted in the form of exemptions from the normal requirements of the
international law of trade, such as, for instance, the implicit
prohibitions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on
measures in restraint of international trade.

The Task of International Lawyers
The active promotion of the right to economic development in
international law is the task of statesmen of the developing countries
and their political and legal advisers. The task of acadefiic
international lawyers is to develop suitable concepts to underpin, not a
New International Economic Order, because that tco is a political task,
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but a jurisprudence of international economic development, with special
emphasis on the refining of the principle of equity in that sphere, in
addition to the traditional task of providing, on a current basis, a
critical analysis of the latest developments of law making in the field.
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